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The European Union (EU)  has come out with a new agenda for the southern neighbourhood, 
reflecting a changing environment in which the Covid-19 pandemic  and the need for a shared 
economic and social recovery are put to the forefront. Does this new agenda respond to the 
demands and practices of the Arab uprisings or does it revert to the stability paradigm? We 
argue that the EU could regain relevance in a multipolar region by putting itself more firmly 
behind citizens and their demands in the region. Rather than seeing citizens as “norm-takers” 
of the EU, it needs to begin to see them as “norm-makers”, including for the EU. Covid-19 has 
so far seemed to delay the EU’s entry into a new era, but it could yet act as a catalyst for the 
bloc to rethink its policies in the longer term. In this respect, the Green Deal may offer most 
potential for the EU to move forward towards a more sustainable and equitable approach that 
puts participatory democracy, the whole range of human rights and social–ecological justice 
upfront.
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2021, the European Commission and the High Representative released a Joint 
Communication aimed at providing a new agenda for the southern neighbourhood (European 
Union 2021). Not for the first time. The document reflects a changing environment in which the 
Covid-19 pandemic and the need for a shared economic and social recovery are put to the fore-
front. It represents a commendable effort to adapt the cooperation agenda to this new (post-)
Covid-19 context and a systematic attempt to identify the tools to make it operational. Some 
months earlier, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) also commemorated the 25th anniversary 
of the Barcelona Process and discussed the need to incorporate new issues, such as health, 
into this regional cooperation mechanism. And yet the past record shows us that those efforts 
may not be enough. The proposals made in the Communication or agreed in the UfM will do no 
harm, quite the opposite. But these efforts may be in vain if the root causes of social unrest in 
the neighbourhood are not addressed, which range from mounting inequalities to the absence 
of political change.
Amid the collective shock of the pandemic, it seems relatively easy to forget what was going 
on before the spread of Covid-19 and what has happened since but gone unnoticed. These are 
times in which it has become difficult to think about anything other than contagion, lockdowns, 
fatalities and vaccines. Yet, the signs of frustration and sustained political and social contesta-
tion in the southern neighbourhood are very visible, for example in the massive and persistent 
protests in Algeria and Lebanon that started in 2019. Citizenship activism has, however, found 
space for dissent being shrunk across the region (including the arrest of journalists in countries 
that used to be presented as reformist champions like Morocco), deteriorating living conditions 
for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Middle East and Europe, and the on-
going Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory. As Charles Tripp (2021) has recently point-
ed out, people in the MENA went from being passive subjects of authoritarian regimes to active 
citizens during the Arab uprisings. And while strengthened authoritarianism seeks to make 
them passive subjects again, citizens are continuing their practices of dissent and solidarity, 
or their “peoplehood” as Larbi Sadiki (2016) has termed it. How does the EU’s own agenda sit 
in this larger picture? Does it sustain such practices of citizenship or does it instead contribute 
to turning citizens in the Arab world into subjects vis-à-vis their own states, and maybe also 
vis-à-vis the EU? 
LOOKING BACK TO MOVE FORWARD
It is worth remembering that back in 2010, a few months before the Arab uprisings, the EU had 
also launched a review of its neighbourhood policy. It was more the result of institutional inertia 
(the review was scheduled) than an appreciation that the neighbourhood needed new types of 
engagement (Soler i Lecha & Viilup 2011). Simultaneously, Spain tried twice to convene a sec-
ond summit of the Union for the Mediterranean and a few weeks before the self-immolation of 
Mohamed Bouazizi, the EU also agreed to open negotiations to grant Ben Ali’s Tunisia “advanced 
status”, meaning strengthened ties with the EU. An undoubted disconnect existed between insti-























The events of 2011 were a turning point for the region. The EU was forced to suddenly reconsider its 
priorities (from reform to democracy) and instruments (conditionality and dialogue with civil society, 
among others), as the communications released in March and May 2011 made clear. More impor-
tantly, it accepted publicly that it had failed to listen to the signals from the region and expressed an 
arguably sincere mea culpa. One example was then Commissioner Štefan Füle arguing that the EU 
“has often focused too much on stability at the expense of other objectives and, more problematic, at 
the expense of our values. Now is the time to bring our interests in line with our values” (Füle 2011).
What has happened since then? The EU has failed to deploy some of the incentives it said it was 
ready to put on the table. Mobility, one of the famous 3 Ms, together with money and markets, is the 
clearest example. The EU was also so absorbed in dealing with its own crises – mainly the sovereign 
debt in Europe’s southern flank – that its leaders had little time and energy to devote to the challeng-
es its southern neighbours were facing. 
When the situation rapidly deteriorated in the form of counter-revolutionary operations, multi-layered 
conflicts, the rise of ISIS, an increase in areas of limited statehood, repression and societal fatigue, 
as well as the further erosion of the legitimacy of governments and institutions, EU leaders rediscov-
ered the importance of the neighbourhood. Once again, however, they did not turn towards it from a 
citizenship or peoplehood perspective, but from a stability one. When the so-called “migration crises” 
of 2015/16 made it clear that instability in North Africa and the Middle East could impact European 
societies and their respective domestic political debates many in the EU dug out the pre-2011 par-
adigm. The causes of instability were not addressed – at best some of its effects were contained 
or externalised (Colombo & Soler i Lecha 2021). Furthermore, and with its migration policy in par-
ticular, the EU has de facto built a wall in the Mediterranean, separating the southern and northern 
shores from each other. As MEDRESET has shWown, the “Mediterranean is perceived by Southern 
stakeholders as a space of division, disparity and separation, performed into being through European 
depoliticizing, securitizing and technocratic practices in the spheres of politics, economics/develop-
ment and migration” (Huber et al. 2018). 
Not only has the EU increasingly separated from the south, the south also increasingly looks towards 
other regional powers. This means the relative weight of the EU has diminished – a potentially enor-
mous loss of political opportunity for European actors. The EU seems to have realised that it is not 
the only game in town and that other regional and global actors have been able to pour in economic 
resources and military supplies and offer political backing. This sharply reduced the effectiveness 
of what the EU was able to put on the table. However, the EU could regain weight in relation to such 
other powers by putting itself more firmly behind citizens and their demands in the region. 
EU-LISTCO has confirmed some of the findings that previous projects such as ArabTransitions, ME-
DRESET and MENARA have already pointed out: (1) it is a mistake to see lack of change as stability 
– in fact, the absence of change, or even of the possibility of change, is one of the main drivers of 
tensions that risk spiralling into governance breakdown and full-fledged societal conflicts (Teti and 
Abbott 2017); (2) there is a need to listen more carefully to the demands and concerns of southern 
Mediterranean societies, including on issues such as equity, social injustice, deficient public services 
provision, corruption and impunity, which are often not among the list of EU priorities (Huber and 
Paciello 2019); (3) the EU may have lost relative weight in the countries in its vicinity but it is far 
from being an irrelevant actor (Colombo et al. 2019). Whatever the EU says or does has an impact 
on countries that are not only geographically close but also connected through history, trade and 
inter-personal relations. 
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The EU has long had a vision for its relationship with the neighbourhood. First it took the form of a shared 
Mediterranean security community, as reflected in the ambitious and still-valid goals of the 1995 Barcelo-
na Declaration. In 2004 it also crafted the idea of a “ring” of stable, prosperous, friendly and well-governed 
neighbours. These visions coincided with major transformational processes in the EU and were, to a large 
extent, projections of such processes. As explained below, the EU is now also engaged in a major trans-
formational process, some of whose key ingredients, such as the digital agenda, the green transition, the 
quest for strategic autonomy and the Conference on the Future of Europe, were accelerated or amplified 
by the pandemic (Bargués 2021). It is high time to rethink relations with its neighbourhood, not only in 
line with the challenges brought by the pandemic (as reflected in the new Agenda for the Mediterranean 
released in February 2021) but through listening to citizens’ concerns and learning from past mistakes. 
ARAB UPRISINGS: AN UNFINISHED 
PROCESS 
Labour and anti-war protests had been bubbling under before 2011, but the Arab uprisings of that 
year saw broad societal participation, building on various social movements. They remain an ongo-
ing phenomenon, as evidenced by the protests which erupted in 2019 in Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan and 
Algeria, and they will continue if the political economy of repression persists. Beginning in the 1970s, 
but accelerating in the 1990s and 2000s, key areas of governance provision have been privatised. At 
the same time, the political system has been restructured not towards more liberalisation but rather 
towards new patronage networks which include the private sector (Guazzone & Pioppi 2012). Due to 
the restructuring, the legitimacy of the state sharply declined and governing elites had to increasingly 
rely on coercive force. As EU-LISTCO has shown, since the uprisings states have become even fierc-
er, “i.e. readier to deploy violence to counter challenges to existing regimes or against specific sec-
tors of the populations” (Bicchi & Legucka 2020). Similarly, Steven Heydemann has recently pointed 
out that the “Arab regimes have responded to the threats posed by the 2011 uprisings not by em-
bracing appeals for inclusive social contracts, but through the imposition of repressive-exclusionary 
social pacts in which previously universal economic and social rights of citizens are being redefined 
as selective benefits” (Heydemann 2020). This further erodes legitimacy and social trust, fostering 
insecurity rather than authoritarian stability (Teti and Abbott 2017).  
Discontent will continue to manifest itself in one way or another, particularly if there is no prospect 
of change. But it may be met by harsher repression by actors that want to preserve the status quo 
and the privileges they currently enjoy. This should concern the EU, not least because authoritarian 
regimes have taken their counter-revolutionary response beyond the state into the larger region and 
increasingly associate themselves with European states to support such positions. This entangles 
the EU and/or its member states with a politics of repression that turns people into subjects, rather 
than supporting their peoplehood. The arms trade which flows from European member states into 
the region is one example. 
In this larger picture, in spite of the colossal changes the southern neighbourhood has undergone, 
the revised ENP remains framed by the model devised in the 2000s. If the EU focuses on investment, 
it needs to ask itself what it is investing in – does it want to invest in resilient societies (resilience 
as defined by EU-LISTCO as transformation) or does it want to continue investing in (authoritarian) 























This question becomes especially pressing as the region approaches a new crossroads. As Rami 
Khouri (2020) has recently pointed out, 
As the Arab system of states now enters its second century of state-building, anxious and 
determined citizens who battled for a better life in the 2010-20 decade will keep trying to make 
sure that they finally exercise their right to, and participate in, their national self-determination.
At this crossroads, the EU can either stand by and watch as geopolitics of repression unfold or dis-
tinguish itself from other powers and become part of a “geopolitics of hope” (Dabashi 2012). Rather 
than seeing citizens as “norm-takers” of the EU, it could begin to see them as “norm-makers”, includ-
ing for the EU. Covid-19 has so far seemed to delay the EU’s entry into a new era, but it could yet act 
as a catalyst for the bloc to rethink its policies in the longer term. 
THE EFFECTS OF COVID-19
Nobody has been spared the effects of the pandemic and the severe measures implemented to try 
to contain it. The shock has been felt almost simultaneously around the world, and Europe and its 
southern neighbourhood are no exception, with very strict measures being enforced since March 
2020. Yet, the impact of the shock has varied between countries and within societies. Those working 
in the informal sector and those with no other safety net than family support have been particularly 
hard-hit. Countries and regions that depend on international tourism or falling fossil fuel prices have 
also paid a larger cost. 
As such, Covid-19 has indirectly given additional centrality to two of the concepts EU-LISTCO focuss-
es on: areas of limited statehood and resilience (Börzel and Risse 2018). The pandemic has put the 
state in the spotlight. This is not peculiar to the southern neighbourhood – it is a global phenomenon 
brought about by an increased social demand for the state to deliver services. At the same time bor-
ders have been sealed, and the cohesion of societies and the legitimacy of institutions have become 
key factors in assessing the uneven success rates of controlling the pandemic. Trust matters.
Public health and social service provisions have gained prominence and may become the benchmark 
against which the strength or weakness of states and public institutions are measured. This has 
clear implications when it comes to the EU policies and programmes in the southern neighbourhood 
and is already reflected both in the discussions within the Union for the Mediterranean and in the 
ENP policy review. And yet there has been a failure to identify a major danger for the months to come: 
the material and emotional cost of the pandemic. This risks eroding the resilience of societies and 
countries, particularly in the event of a process of economic recovery that could amplify inequalities. 
The vaccination process, with citizens scrutinising whether certain groups are privileged over the rest of 
the society for reasons other than the medical, could reinforce pre-existing social and political grievances 
at local or national level. This could also acquire regional dimensions. In the occupied Palestinian territory 
(OPT), for example, Israel has so far refused to fulfil its obligations as the occupying power when it comes 
to providing vaccines to the Palestinian population (Asi 2021). In the Mediterranean, the different speed 
of vaccination processes in the two rims could further widen the gap between Europe and its neighbours. 
This allows a fertile field for competing global and regional powers to assist governments and societies, 
thus eroding the EU’s reputation and leverage in its immediate vicinity. 
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An additional risk is that of fostering conflict. The pandemic has dashed many hopes and trun-
cated countless individual projects. One of the hypotheses put forward is that Covid-19 may 
prolong conflict in the Middle East, among other reasons by empowering non-state actors that 
fill “governance voids to provide services to local communities” (Alaaldin 2020). Contrary to the 
early proposal by the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, that the pandemic should be used 
as an opportunity to enforce a global ceasefire and boost conflict-resolution processes, the 
post-pandemic situation could contribute to thawing frozen conflicts – this may be happening, 
for instance, in the Western Sahara. 
The effects of the pandemic in the EU are also shaping the ambition and orientation of EU policies to-
wards the neighbourhood. This goes well beyond the new agenda and the identification of the instru-
ments listed in February 2021’s Joint Communication. It has to do with the EU’s own resilience. The 
pandemic has accelerated previous debates on the need to transform and to transition towards new 
economic, social and political models. The green recovery, the digital agenda and strategic autono-
my have gained traction and have become even more relevant. Those transformational projects are 
now backed by additional resources and provide a narrative on the EU’s intended destination. This 
multi-layered transition will have global repercussions and neighbours are naturally among those 
that could be most exposed. 
HOW TO MOVE FORWARD? 
As these new narratives emerge in the EU’s foreign policy discourse, the Green Deal may offer 
most potential for the EU to move forward. The focus so far has been on the EU itself and the 
proposals remain on the more conservative side of green thought. Nonetheless, it holds enor-
mous potential to make the EU a (green) power that is relevant to the needs of people in its 
neighbourhood, ensuring that the region is resilient, inclusive and secure. The idea of a “deal” 
also evokes the need to remake social contracts. This is a valid premise everywhere, but even 
more so in the southern neighbourhood.
A “Green ENP” would need to involve a profound rethink to conceive of a more sustainable and 
equitable model that puts participatory democracy, the whole range of human rights and so-
cial–ecological justice upfront. It would thereby work to boost resilience and resist the political 
economy of repression outlined above. Central parameters of such policies should be invest-
ment in production for local communities, creation of good quality jobs, ensuring human rights 
including land rights and access to water, local participatory democracy and citizenship prac-
tices, and investment in local research on environmental technology, among others. To ensure 
such parameters find their place in the actual programming, policy should not only be devised 
by Brussels – it should emerge from consultations with the communities at which EU policies 
are directed or affect. Furthermore, the ENP cannot be seen separately from other EU policies 
that impact the neighbourhood profoundly, such as those on security, trade and migration. 
All these policies should be screened from a green perspective (paying particular attention to 
social rights/environmental effects). The Green Deal also holds the potential to provide the EU 
with a new identity and a new narrative around which the member states could unite to ensure 
a more cohesive foreign policy. This is of the essence for a European foreign policy which has 
suffered from profound divisions in the past years as the “Normative Power Europe” narrative 























Overall, the Joint Communication for a new agenda for the southern neighbourhood has the merit of 
indicating some areas where there is space to scale up Euro-Mediterranean cooperation such as health 
and sustainability. Yet, the EU still needs to review and find new solutions for the larger questions. It 
needs to address not only the lack of unity it has displayed when dealing with regional conflicts, but also 
the need to profoundly revise its policies to support locally driven and inclusive transformations. 
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